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adjustment for oil integrated firms. Moreover, testing for asymmetric cointegration, we also
find that oil price falls impact substantially the value of oil producers and integrated firms,
but the same is not found for oil price hikes. Overall, the evidence suggests that firm value
stays above equilibrium relationship when there are oil price hikes.
JEL classification: G15; Q43
Keywords: Asymmetric Cointegration; ECM models; MTAR models; Oil Prices; Oil In-
dustry.
∗The authors acknowledge financial support from Fundac¸a˜o para a Cieˆncia e Tecnologia PEst-
OE/EGE/UI0315/2011 and from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, research projects ECO2009-
08100 and MTM2010-17323.
†Business Research Center/UNIDE, Lisbon University Institute (ISCTE-IUL), Avenida das Forc¸as Armadas,
1600-083 Lisboa, Portugal.
‡Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (Department of Statistics and Instituto Flores de Lemus), C/ Madrid 126,
28903 Getafe, Spain. BRU/UNIDE, Avenida das Forc¸as Armadas, 1600-083 Lisboa, Portugal. Tel:+34916248902,
Fax:+34916249849. Email: mhveiga@est-econ.uc3m.es. Corresponding author.
§Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (Department of Business Administration), C/ Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe,
Spain.
I. Introduction
It is well documented in the literature that stock returns of oil firms are associated with changes
in oil prices and stock market returns (see e.g. Boyer and Filion, 2007; El-Sharif et al., 2005;
Nandha and Faff, 2008; Ramos and Veiga, 2011; Sadorsky, 1999, 2001). Studies also show that
there is an asymmetric relationship between stock returns and oil price changes, i.e., the increase
in industry returns with oil price hikes is proportionally greater than the decrease resulting from
falls in oil prices, disclosing a pass-through effect. Ramos and Veiga (2011) discuss that firms can
pass price increases through customers, either because demand is not sufficiently depressed by
price spikes or firms in this industry have considerable market power. Both effects together can
explain why positive changes in oil prices influence oil and gas stock returns more than negative
changes.
Despite investors’ and corporate managers’ concern about long term risks, the analysis con-
tinues to focus on short term variations that are subject to considerable noise. Therefore, a long
term view is potentially more helpful in understanding the underlying drivers of the market value
of the oil industry.
Our work analyzes whether there is a long term relationship between oil prices and firm value
and, if so, the nature of the relationship. We use data from December 1987 to August 2011 on
U.S. oil industry firms, covering both oil producer and exploration firms, and oil integrated firms.
These firms face common exposure to fluctuating prices of a commodity traded globally.
Cointegration is commonly used to analyze long term dependence between variables, and this
methodology has been refined to accommodate nonlinear time series behavior, i.e., to account
for the possibility that the relationship between the variables might not be the same whenever
they increase or decrease. Given the evidence of asymmetric responses, we propose to use two
nonlinear cointegration methods. First, we estimate the momentum threshold autoregressive
(MTAR) model developed by Enders and Siklos (2001) designed to detect asymmetric short
run adjustments to the long run equilibrium between variables. This specification is especially
relevant when the adjustment is such that the series exhibits more momentum in one direction
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than the other. Second, we also use the concept of asymmetric cointegration developed by
Schorderet (2003) that allows the existence of cointegration among nonstationary components of
data series rather than the series themselves.
The results are as follows: We document a nonlinear long term relation between the market
value of oil firms and oil prices, supporting the conjecture of non-symmetric adjustments to
the long term equilibrium. Our findings complement the literature that reports evidence of
asymmetric reactions in the short run (Nandha and Faff, 2008; Ramos and Veiga, 2011).
Our analysis differentiates between the adjustment for oil producers and for oil integrated
firms. Oil is simultaneously the main output of the exploration and production industry and
an input for integrated firms. Thus, depending on the price elasticity of oil, oil price hikes may
generate higher revenues for the upstream segment and an increase of input costs followed by
a reduction of supply in the petroleum refinery (Lee and Ni, 2002). We therefore investigate
whether the impact of oil price changes is equal along the oil business value chain.
Using a MTAR model, the results show that the adjustment for oil producers is faster in
the case of oil price falls, suggesting that firm value stays above the equilibrium relationship
whenever there are price hikes. We do not find this relation for integrated firms.
Using Schorderet (2003)’s asymmetric cointegration concept, we also find that oil producers
and integrated firms are cointegrated with oil when there is a fall in oil prices.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze the nonlinear adjustment of oil firm value
to oil prices from a long term perspective. Our results are helpful in understanding the impact
of oil price in the oil and gas industry market value. Besides short run asymmetric responses,
oil firm value changes in the long run asymmetrically with oil price changes. Moreover, the
results show a distinction between the relation of oil prices and oil producers, and oil prices and
integrated firms. The former exhibits more dependence on oil price changes. Overall, our results
have implications for investment and risk management decisions. In particular, they indicate
that investors should hedge against losses resulting from oil price falls mainly for investments
in oil producing firms, while corporate managers should engage in hedging strategies to protect
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firm value from oil price falls.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature. Section III describes
the data and the summary statistics. Section IV reports the results obtained with the different
cointegration concepts. Section V provides a discussion and concludes.
II. Review of Literature
The interest of investors in oil companies has grown with the upsurge in oil prices. A number
of works have looked for drivers of returns in the oil and natural gas industry, such as the
market portfolio, interest and currency rates, as well as oil prices. The evidence confirms that oil
and gas companies’ returns follow stock market and oil returns. Faff and Brailsford (1999) for
Australian oil and gas industry equity returns, Sadorsky (2001) and Boyer and Filion (2007) for
Canada, El-Sharif et al. (2005) for U.K., Al-Mudaf and Goodwin (1993) for the U.S., Park and
Ratti (2008) and Oberndorfer (2009) for Europe and Ramos and Veiga (2011) for a sample of 34
countries. The above work has examined this question using both multifactor models (Basher
and Sadorsky, 2006; Nandha and Faff, 2008; Sadorsky, 2008; Ramos and Veiga, 2011), and vector
autoregressive models (Cong et al., 2008; Park and Ratti, 2008; Sadorsky, 1999).
An important finding is that oil and gas industry returns respond asymmetrically to changes
in oil prices, i.e., oil price rises have a greater impact on stock returns than oil price drops (the
so-called asymmetric effects). This evidence is pervasive at international level. Both Nandha
and Faff (2008) using global industry indices and Ramos and Veiga (2011) using a sample of oil
industries of 34 countries, find evidence of a pass-through effect in the oil industry. The increase
in industry returns with oil price hikes is proportionally greater than the decrease resulting from
falls in oil prices.
Few papers have distinguished the impact of oil price changes inside the oil industry. Aleisa
et al. (2004) and Scholtens and Wang (2008) do not find differences between oil and gas producers
(upstream) and the equipment, services and distribution companies (downstream). Boyer and
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Filion (2007) using a sample of Canadian firms find that integrated firms only show sensitivity to
market returns and to oil and natural gas; whereas producers show also sensitivity to exchange
rate and interest rates. Recently, Ramos et al. (2012) have analyzed the presence of asymmetry
in the upstream and downstream segment of the U.S. oil industry. They find that both stock
returns of both upstream and downstream firms follow stock market and oil price returns, but
the evidence for asymmetric effects is more pervasive across measures and time on the upstream
segment.
However, few works have investigated the long term relation between oil and oil firm value.
Aleisa et al. (2004) is an exception; using Johansen cointegration tests they find that price shocks
in oil futures explain price movements in Standard & Poor oil indexes.
More recently, nonlinear cointegration methods have been applied to analyze long term de-
pendence of stock markets on oil (see e.g. Maghyereh and Al-Khandari, 2007; Zhu et al., 2011)
and of Gross Domestic Product on oil prices (see Lardic and Mignon, 2008).
III. Data
The sample includes monthly stock prices of oil exploration and production, and of integrated
firms (usually petroleum refiners) of the U.S. oil industry (expl&prod and integ, respectively),
the U.S. market (market) and the oil prices (oil) from December 1987 to August 2011. Data are
drawn from Datastream. More details on the sample are given below.
The oil industry Following Boyer and Filion (2007), we split our sample of firms into produc-
ers and integrated firms. We use Datastream Industry Classification and extract U.S. subsector
indexes of oil exploration and production and integrated firms.
Exploration and production refers to the initial part of oil value chain, where firms look for
new oil resources and bring them to the surface. Oil and natural gas are the main outputs of
this industry.
Integrated oil and gas companies are firms that participate in every aspect of the oil or gas
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business, which includes the discovering, obtaining, production, refining, and distribution of oil
and gas. Oil is transformed into an array of products, including gasoline, distillate fuels, and
jet fuel that are used in other industry businesses. Research work documents that there is a
relation between the price of crude oil and refined products (see Asche et al., 2003; Girma and
Paulson, 1999; Serletis, 1994). Therefore, it is likely that integrated firms show some sensitivity
to changes in oil prices.
Market Previous studies are unanimous about the relation between the market returns and
oil firm stock returns. Thus our analysis controls for the long term dependence on the U.S. stock
market. To proxy the U.S. market, we use the stock market price index computed by Datastream
(market), a value weighted price index.
Oil Oil prices are from the settlement price of the NYMEX oil futures contract, the most widely
traded futures contract on oil. The underlying asset is the West Texas Intermediate oil; this is a
light crude oil widely used as a current benchmark for U.S. crude production. Prices are in U.S.
dollars per barrel (U$/BBL)(oil).
Summary statistics Table I describes the summary statistics of the variables expl&prod,
integ, market and oil. The monthly mean returns range from 0.6% for the U.S. market returns
to 0.8% for integ returns. Oil returns have the highest standard deviation (0.095%). Moreover,
all series depict high values of skewness and kurtosis leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis
of normality.
Table II shows the correlation coefficients among the four series. The two segments of the U.S.
oil industry are highly correlated (0.934). We also find a high correlation between each industry
and the oil prices, although oil prices are slightly more correlated with segment producers than
with integrated firms. The correlations are 0.958 and 0.860, respectively. Oil and stock market
prices are the least correlated (0.600). The correlation between stock market prices and integ
(expl&prod) prices is 0.897 (0.705).
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Figures 1 and 2 plot the four series of prices in logarithms. We can observe a clear comovement
among them, especially from October 2003 until the end of the sample, and a close comovement
of the expl&prod (integ) and oil prices in the sample. A closer look at the figures allows us to
detect a lagged comovement between expl&prod (integ) and oil prices. In particular, a sharp
decrease of oil price in the middle of sample is followed in the next months by decreases in the
expl&prod and integ prices. Moreover, market prices seem to diverge from the other price series
in the middle of the sample. Overall, there seems to be a time-varying long-run relationship
among the price series and an asymmetric long-run relationship between expl&prod (integ) and
oil prices that cannot be detected using the usual concept of cointegration.
Unit root tests Following Shen et al. (2007) and Lardic and Mignon (2008), we proceed by
detecting if there are unit roots in each price series by applying the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) test directly to the logarithms of the series of prices. Table III reports the results of the
unit root tests. We do not reject the the null hypothesis of a unit root for any of the series in
levels. We proceed by applying the ADF test to the return series and conclude that they are
stationary. Therefore, the overall unit root tests indicate that all price series are integrated of
order one (I(1)).
Engle-Granger cointegration test The series are cointegrated if they are I(1), but there
is a linear combination among them that is stationary (I(0)). With the purpose of testing for
cointegration, we estimate the following regressions by OLS:
expl&prodt = a0 + a1oilt + a2markett + e1t (1)
and
integt = b0 + b1oilt + b2markett + e2t, (2)
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and we apply the ADF test to the residuals of the previous regressions (eˆ1t and eˆ2t).
1 The results
of the ADF on the series of residuals are listed in Table IV. In both cases, we do not reject
the null of unit root implying that the previous series of prices are not linearly cointegrated.
The results are not surprising since the usual concept of cointegration is restrictive and as we
have mentioned previously, there seems to be a time-varying long-run relationship among these
variables. In the next section, we present broader concepts of cointegration that may help us
understand the long-run relationship among these variables.
IV. Cointegration
In this section we describe two types of cointegration. The first is the nonlinear cointegration also
denoted momentum threshold cointegration. The second is the asymmetric cointegration that
allows positive and negative partial sums to have a different effect on the long-run relationship
among variables. A major strength of these methods is that they account for the possibility of
asymmetric adjustments in the variables.
A. Nonlinear cointegration
Suppose that three variables yt, xt and zt are I(1). In order to confirm whether these variables
have a nonlinear cointegration relationship, we apply the two-step methodology proposed by
Enders and Siklos (2001). The procedure is as follows. First, we estimate the long-run equilibrium
relationship among yt, xt and zt as:
yt = c0 + c1xt + c2zt + εt, (3)
where c0, c1 and c2 are the parameters and εt is a disturbance term. If variables yt, xt and zt are
cointegrated, then the OLS estimators converge faster than those of the stationary variables for
the true values of the parameters. Second, we determine if εt is stationary. Enders and Granger
1We keep the lags that are statistical significant in the auxiliary regression of the ADF test.
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(1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001) consider the following momentum-threshold autoregressive
cointegration model (M-TAR):
∆εt =Mtρ1εt−1 + (1−Mt)ρ2εt−1 +
k∑
i=1
δi∆εt−i + t, (4)
where ρ1, ρ2 and δi are coefficients, t is a white-noise disturbance, k is the number of lags and
Mt is an indicator function such that:
Mt =


1 if ∆εt−1 ≥ 0
0 if ∆εt−1 < 0.
(5)
The variables yt, xt and zt are nonlinear cointegrated, if the null hypothesis of no cointegration
(H0 : ρ1 = ρ2 = 0) and the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment (H0 : ρ1 = ρ2) are both
rejected. The F -statistics for the null hypothesis of no cointegration using the M-TAR model
is denoted Φ∗ and has a nonstandard distribution (see Enders and Siklos, 2001, for details and
critical values). On the other hand, once we have rejected the first null hypothesis, the second
test of symmetric adjustment follows a standard F -distribution. The rejection of this second
null hypothesis means that if yt−1 is above its long-run equilibrium, the adjustment in the next
period is ρ1, and ρ2 if yt−1 is below the long-run equilibrium relationship.
The MTAR model permits the adjustment process to depend on the previous period’s error
change and it is useful if the adjustment process exhibits more momentum in one direction than
the other. M is known as the heaviside indicator. Within the MTAR model, one can examine
the differential effects of the positive versus the negative phases of changes in oil prices on the
behavior of oil firm value.
The nonlinear error-correction models for yt, xt and zt are:
∆yt = α0 + θ11Mtεˆt−1 + θ12(1−Mt)εˆt−1 +
k∑
i=1
α1i∆yt−i +
k∑
i=1
α2i∆xt−i +
k∑
i=1
α3i∆zt−i + 1t, (6)
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∆xt = β0 + θ21Mtεˆt−1 + θ22(1−Mt)εˆt−1 +
k∑
i=1
β1i∆yt−i +
k∑
i=1
β2i∆xt−i +
k∑
i=1
β3i∆zt−i + 2t (7)
and
∆zt = ψ0 + θ31Mtεˆt−1 + θ32(1−Mt)εˆt−1 +
k∑
i=1
ψ1i∆yt−i +
k∑
i=1
ψ2i∆xt−i +
k∑
i=1
ψ3i∆zt−i + 3t (8)
where θ11 and θ12 are the speeds of adjustment of ∆yt if yt−1 is above and below its long-run
equilibrium, respectively. On the other hand, θ21 and θ22 represent the speeds of adjustment of
∆xt in the two regimes and θ31 and θ32 are, analogously, the speed of adjustment in the two
regimes for ∆zt.
Nonlinear cointegration test results Table V reports the estimation results of the M-TAR
model and the nonlinear cointegration tests for the producers and integrated firms in the oil
industry. The null hypotheses of no cointegration and symmetric cointegration are both rejected
for the two segments of the oil industry at all significance levels. This means that adjustments
to the equilibrium are different across positive and negative errors.
Nonlinear error correction model Tables VI and VII report the estimation results of the
nonlinear error correction models (equations (6), (7) and (8)) for the two segments of the oil
industry. Given that for the segment producers (expl&prod) |ρ1| < |ρ2| this means that the
M-TAR model exhibits more momentum, that is, the adjustment is stronger in one direction
than in the other direction. In particular, for this segment there is substantial adjustment to
the long-run equilibrium when the returns of the segment producers are below this relation of
equilibrium (∆εˆt−1 < 0) and less adjustment in the other direction (∆εˆt−1 ≥ 0). The estimate
coefficients of Mt∆εˆt−1 and (1 −Mt)∆εˆt−1 are 0.001 and -0.01, respectively (see ∆expl&prod
column of Table VI). The first speed of adjustment is not statistically significant at any relevant
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significance level while the p-value of the second speed of adjustment is 0.133. The stock prices
of the producers adjust more quickly to bad news than to good news, similar to the results of
Koutmos (1998).
Moreover, since ∆oilt−1 and ∆markett−1 are not statistically significant, oil and market
returns do not Granger cause expl&prod returns. Looking to the second and third columns of
Table VI, we observe that the results are analogous. Bad news impacts oil and market returns
more quickly than good news.
Table VI shows that in the long run, the adjustment for oil price falls is faster for the three
variables than for oil price increases. Strikingly, producers and the stock market do not seem to
respond to short-run oil price changes, which might suggest that short-run effects are subsumed
by long-run effects.
The results are different for integrated firms (integ) (see Table VII). The returns of segment
petroleum refiners and the oil returns are only explained by their past values. Since |θ31| = |θ32|,
the speed of adjustment of the market prices is of similar magnitude whether the prices of integ
are above or below the long-run equilibrium.
Overall, the adjustment parameters for the producers indicate that when variables depart
from their underlying equilibrium relationship, adjustment back to equilibrium is more rapid
when oil prices decrease (below long run value), than when oil prices increase (above long run
value).
B. Asymmetric Cointegration
In section III we have detected a possible nonlinear long-run relationship among oil exploration
and producers, oil and stock market prices that has been confirmed by the existence of a non-
linear cointegration relationship among them. Figures 1 and 2 also suggest there is a lagged
co-movement among oil prices and, expl&prod and integ prices, in particular, for price falls.
This empirical effect is not observed for the market prices, especially in the period between 2000
and 2003 (see Figure 1). This would suggest that in the long run expl&prod and integ prices
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tend to react asymmetrically to oil price shocks.
In order to confirm this empirical evidence observed from figures 1 and 2, we use a different
concept of cointegration that distinguishes between positive and negative increments of oil price
and allows us to determine which increments affect its long-run relationship with expl&prod
and integ. To this end, we follow Schorderet (2003) and apply the concept of asymmetric
cointegration. Let Yt be a time series that can be decomposed into two partial sums, a positive
(Y +t ) and a negative (Y
−
t ), such as:
Y +t =
t−1∑
i=0
1{∆Yt−i ≥ 0}∆Yt−i and Y
−
t =
t−1∑
i=0
1{∆Yt−i < 0}∆Yt−i. (9)
Y1t and Y2t are two I(1) time series and define Y
+
jt and Y
−
jt for j = 1, 2 according to equation
(9). There is an asymmetric cointegration between Y1t and Y2t if there is a linear combination
between Y +jt and Y
−
jt
zt = β0Y
+
1t + β1Y
−
1t + β2Y
+
2t + β3Y
−
1t , (10)
such that zt is stationary. The cointegrated vector must satisfy β0 6= β1 or β2 6= β3 (and β0
or β1 6= 0 and β2 or β3 6= 0). Assuming that one component of each series appears in the
cointegration equation (10), we may write
z1t = Y
+
1t − β
+Y +2t or z2t = Y
−
1t − β
−Y −2t . (11)
Given that the OLS estimators of the previous parameters are biased in finite samples, Schorderet
(2003) proposes to estimate the following auxiliary regressions by OLS:
ξ1t = Y
−
1t +∆Y
+
1t − β
−Y −2t or ξ2t = Y
+
1t +∆Y
−
1t − β
+Y +2t . (12)
The OLS estimators are in this case asymptotically normal (see also Lardic and Mignon, 2008).
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Asymmetric cointegration test results In our particular case, we test for asymmetric coin-
tegration between expl&prod and oil, and integ and oil, by estimating the following equations:
expl&prod−t +∆expl&prod
+
t = α
− + β−oil−t + ξ1t
expl&prod+t +∆expl&prod
−
t = α
+ + β+oil+t + ξ2t (13)
and
integ−t +∆integ
+
t = θ
− + ψ−oil−t + s1t
integ+t +∆integ
−
t = θ
+ + ψ+oil+t + s2t. (14)
There is asymmetric cointegration between expl&prod (integ) and oil prices if ξ1t and/or ξ2t (s1t
and/or s2t) are stationary. We check this by applying the usual ADF tests to the residuals. Table
VIII reports the results of the ADF tests. Considering ξˆ1t, it appears that for the production firms
of the oil industry, oil prices and expl&prod seem to be asymmetrically cointegrated. The same
happens for the integrated firms since we reject the null hypothesis of unit root for the s1t series
of residuals. As for oil price increases, we cannot conclude there is asymmetric cointegration.
Overall, falls in oil prices seem to affect expl&prod and integ prices in the long run.
V. Conclusion
Firm managers and investors of commodity dependent industries are concerned about how
changes in the price of the main commodity potentially impact the value of the firm. It is thus
paramount to gain insights into the long term economic relationship between these variables.
Our study analyzes whether the value of oil firms (producers and integrated firms) is related
to the price of oil in the long run. The analysis is done using nonlinear cointegration models that
account for the possibility of an asymmetric adjustment process to the long-run equilibrium. Our
main empirical finding is that there are long-run asymmetric responses of firm value to oil price
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changes. The presence of nonlinear cointegration is confirmed under the momentum threshold
autoregressive model which reveals asymmetries in the adjustment process. We find that the
speed of adjustment is different depending whether the deviations are above or below the long
term relation. The results show that the adjustment for oil producers is faster when there are
drops in the price of oil, but we do not find a similar adjustment for integrated firms. Using the
concept of asymmetric cointegration, we also confirm that negative increments of oil prices affect
the long-run equilibrium between producer (integrated) firm prices and oil prices.
The asymmetric relationship of firm value in the long run is consistent with several explana-
tions. First, with the option valuation approach. Firm value in the natural resources business
is regarded as the value of an option on the main commodity. Works such as Pindyck (1990)
assume that production permanently stops as soon as the price falls below extraction cost. When
this occurs, the reserves which are not yet extracted are lost and the producers do not have the
option to resume production in the future. Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) refer that, in
the case of some oil wells, a complete cessation of production can reduce the total recovery. The
asymmetric relationship is a natural outcome of the asymmetric relationship between the value
of the option and the value of underlying asset.
The results can also reflect the competitive structure of this industry. Factors such as the
industrial structure, the substitutability between goods and the barriers to entry can enhance
the market power of companies. Thus, firm value changes asymmetrically in the long run with
oil price because firms can pass through oil price increases to customers.
Finally, we cannot disregard the hypothesis that the asymmetric relationship mirrors some
irrational behavior by investors. A strand of literature has proved that investors’ non-rational
behavior originates mispricing of securities (Daniel et al., 1998, 2002).
Results highlight the need for hedging, because firm value is negatively affected by oil price
falls in the long run. Overall, it not only suggests that firm managers should hedge to protect their
value from falls in oil price, but that investors should also protect the value of their investment
from oil price falls.
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Moreover, the implications of these results are related with market inefficiency. The cointe-
gration analysis characterizes the dynamic relation of the variables, and, as such, it is possible
to use information from oil markets to predict trends in stock markets. Results suggest scope for
arbitrage opportunities due to the presence of deviations from the long-run equilibrium, as well
as different speeds of adjustment, i.e., a rapid adjustment to equilibrium values only when oil
price falls. Conversely, when oil price increases, firm value seems to stay above the equilibrium
relationship for a long time.
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Figure 1. Time series of expl&prod, market and oil prices. The three series are in logarithms.
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Figure 2. Time series of integ, market and oil prices. The three series are in logarithms.
18
Table I
Summary statistics
This table presents the summary statistics of the returns of expl&prod, integ,
oil and market. The sample period ranges from 1987:12 through 2011:08.
By column, we report the mean, the standard deviation (SD), the kurtosis,
the skewness and the Jarque-Bera test statistics and its p-value.
variables mean SD skewness kurtosis Jarque-Bera p-value
expl&prod 0.007 0.070 -0.136 4.320 20.550 0.000
integ 0.008 0.045 -0.038 3.956 10.260 0.006
oil 0.007 0.095 -0.359 5.393 68.797 0.000
market 0.006 0.044 -0.830 4.687 64.658 0.000
Table II
Correlation coefficients
This table presents the correlations among the logarithms of
the variables in levels: expl&prod, oil andmarket. The sample
period ranges from 1987:12 through 2011:08.
variables expl&prod integ oil market
expl&prod 1.000
integ 0.934 1.000
oil 0.958 0.860 1.000
market 0.705 0.897 0.600 1.000
Table III
Unit root tests on individual series
This table reports the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test
(ADF). The sample period ranges from 1987:12 through 2011:08. *
(resp.**): Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% (resp. 1%) signif-
icance level. The three original series are in logarithms. The auxiliar
regression of the test includes a constant and the number of lags (k) is
12.
Series in logarithms Series in first differences
variables ADF(k) ADF(k)
expl&prod -0.141 -4.680∗∗
integ -0.951 -4.298∗∗
oil -0.222 -5.483∗∗
market -1.946 -4.307∗∗
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Table IV
Engle-Granger ADF cointegration tests
This table presents the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) on the residual
series of equations ((1) and (2)). The sample period ranges from 1987:12 through 2011:08.
* (resp.**): Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% (resp. 1%) significance level. The
three original series are in logarithms. The auxiliar regression includes a constant and the
k number of lags (k), those that are statistical significant.
Dependent variable of equation (3) Engle-Granger ADF statistics Cointegration
yt = expl&prodt -0.288 No
yt = integt -0.288 No
Table V
Enders-Siklos nonlinear cointegration tests
This table reports the results of the Enders-Siklos nonlinear cointegration tests us-
ing the M-TAR specification (4). The sample period ranges from 1987:12 through
2011:08. * (resp.**): Rejection of the null hypotheses at the 5% (resp. 1%) sig-
nificance level. The critical values of Φ∗ statistic are given in Table 1 of Enders
and Siklos (2001). F indicates F -statistic for the null hypothesis of symmetric
adjustment, ρ1 = ρ2. The values in parenthesis are the p-values.
H0 : ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 H0 : ρ1 = ρ2
Dependent variable M-TAR: Φ∗ M-TAR: F -test
residual changes of expl&prod 185.12∗∗ 360.37∗∗ (0.000)
residual changes of integ 172.00∗∗ 342.82∗∗ (0.000)
Table VI
M-TAR nonlinear error-correction models: expl&prod, oil and market
This table reports the estimation results of equations (6), (7) and (8)). The
sample period ranges from 1987:12 through 2011:08. The values in parentheses
are the p-values.
∆expl&prodt ∆oilt ∆markett
Mtεˆt−1 0.001 (0.891) -0.003 (0.629) -0.008 (0.062)
(1−Mt)εˆt−1 -0.010 (0.133) -0.027 (0.000) -0.010 (0.023)
∆expl&prodt−1 -0.137 (0.016) – -0.068 (0.123)
∆oilt−1 – 0.098 (0.016) –
∆markett−1 – – 0.119 (0.086)
constant 0.030 (0.427) 0.087 (0.020) 0.060 (0.024)
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Table VII
M-TAR nonlinear error-correction models: integ, oil and market
This table presents the estimation results of equations ((6), (7) and (8)). The
sample period ranges from 1987:12 through 2011:08. The values in parentheses
are the p-values.
∆integt ∆oilt ∆markett
Mtεˆt−1 -0.003 (0.527) -0.0001 (0.990) -0.008 (0.069)
(1−Mt)εˆt−1 -0.003 (0.521) -0.0001 (0.990) -0.008 (0.075)
∆integt−1 -0.110 (0.112) – –
∆oilt−1 – 0.179 (0.021) –
∆markett−1 – – 0.131 (0.050)
constant 0.026 (0.398) 0.007 (0.910) 0.064 (0.028)
Table VIII
Asymmetric cointegration tests
This table presents the results of the ADF unit root tests on the residuals of equations (13)
and (14). The sample period ranges from 1987:12 through 2011:08. * (resp.**): Rejection of
the null hypotheses at the 5% (resp. 1%) significance level. The values in parenthesis are the
p-values.
ADF test on ξ1t ADF test on ξ2t ADF test on s1t ADF test on s2t
expl&prod -4.861∗∗ (0.000) 1.113 (0.995) – –
integ – – -4.861∗∗ (0.000) 1.113 (0.953)
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